

No running head on chapter opening pages

All chapter heads should match in font, size, and placement on page.

Chapter Six ← chapter number
16 pt., centered

The Uneasy Reconciliation ← chapter title
18 pt., bold, centered

No indent for first line after chapter head →

In the 1968 presidential election, the Democrats nominated Johnson's vice president, Hubert Humphrey, a New Deal liberal who preached "the politics of joy" to weary and divided Americans. The Republicans, stung by their overwhelming defeat four years earlier, nominated the reliable Richard Nixon. Nixon had been narrowly, and some said fraudulently, defeated by Kennedy in 1960, and then was defeated again when he ran for governor in his home state of California. He announced that he was quitting politics and moving to New York City to live the comfortable life of a corporation lawyer.¹

standard indent .25" →

But Nixon retained an intense interest in politics and campaigned as a private citizen for the Republican Party. The Vietnam War was not going well for Democratic politicians, and public sentiment was turning against the endless casualties that came into the homes of everyone who owned a television. During the campaign, Humphrey was restricted from being too receptive to peace overtures because of Johnson's control over the party, while Nixon sounded both bellicose and reasonable in seeking a way out of the unpopular war.

A-level subhead 14 pt., bold, and centered.

All should be identical in style.

← Two line spaces above

→ **Nixon and the Red Peril**

← One line space below

Richard Milhous Nixon was one of the few U.S. politicians known by reputation to many Communist leaders. Born to a modest family in California on January 9, 1913, he had significantly advanced in the cause of conservative Republican politics, from the House of Representatives to the U.S. Senate, to being Eisenhower's youthful running mate in 1952 and 1956. In those campaigns he had skillfully and unscrupulously used the fear of communism against his political opponents at home, labeling them often dangerously naive or actual traitors. He epitomized the Cold War rhetoric of the time and formed close associations with the Republican right wing and the China lobby. In 1952, Nixon bitterly casti-

Do not indent first line after A-level subhead.

drop folio should be no more than .25" from the bottom of the text block.

Running heads are included in the text block measurement. Drop folios are not.

Running head - even pg. nos. → 180 flush left, with chapter no. - 9 pt. type

← One to two line spaces between running head and text - must be consistent

gated Truman and cited Secretary of State Acheson as heading up a coterie of cowardly traitors. He especially criticized the loss of China, blaming it on the errors of the Democrats.²

During the Korean conflict, Nixon supported General Douglas MacArthur's demand to bomb Chinese bases across the Yalu River, and he called for a total embargo of arms and strategic matériel to China. Nixon consistently opposed recognizing the People's Republic of China, supported unleashing Chiang to fight in the Korean War, and wanted to pledge U.S. air and naval strength to the defense of Taiwan.³ When Eisenhower began his concerted attempt to end the war, Nixon watched the old general's astute maneuvers ~~never~~ really understanding what he was doing. For him the war ended because Eisenhower threatened to use nuclear weapons against the Chinese. During most of his later public life, Nixon would approve of what he called "the mad man theory"—that is, intimidating a foe by posing the possibility that an American leader could become so furious and unbalanced that he would unleash a nuclear attack.

→ em dash

B-level subhead 12 pt., flush left

Ending the War

Eisenhower ended the war, and then wavered over the issue of the offshore islands. Although he was personally inspired by the generalissimo on Taiwan, Nixon admitted later that Chiang's plans to return to the mainland were unrealistic. Still, in the two Quemoy crises of 1954 and 1958, Nixon supported the Nationalist government and urged that the United States use nuclear weapons if the Chinese Communists embarked on new aggressions. He insisted that the Chinese Communists wanted more than Quemoy, Matsu, and Formosa. "They want the whole world," he concluded. As expected, on more than one occasion Nixon compared Eisenhower's resolve to Truman's alleged weakness, which led to the loss of the mainland.⁴

In the presidential debates with Kennedy in October 1960, Nixon emphasized the importance of Quemoy and Matsu as islands in "the area of freedom." In 1960 he insisted,

Okay indented or flush left after B-level subheads.

There is no nation in the world today... which is more an outlaw nation than Red China, [its chief Mao Tse-tung] might welcome a Third World War as a means to spread communism.

In the mid-1960s as a private citizen, Nixon continued his hostility toward the Chinese Communists, arguing that the Vietcong were instigated and supported by the mainland regime, and that the real enemy facing America was China. The Communist objective was to turn the Pacific into "a Red Sea." He argued, "It was imperative that the United States should stop Chinese Communist aggression in Vietnam now, and not wait until the odds and risks are much greater."⁵

Ellipses should have one space between each dot.

} Extract quote 9 pt. type with standard indent (.25") on both margins - one line space above and one below

running heads
are odd-numbered
with pg. nos. flush
right and chapter
title.

In October 1967, Nixon however published an eventful article titled "Asia after Vietnam" in the prestigious establishment journal *Foreign Affairs*. He had apparently been influenced by the Sino-Soviet split and his own recent visits as a private citizen to Asia. In the article, Nixon avoided the harsh rhetoric and certainties of a monolithic Communism that he was so associated with publicly over the years. Now he was arguing that a preoccupation with Vietnam should not remain the hallmark of America's foreign policy in Asia. Rather remarkably Nixon insisted that while the United States had to recognize the danger from Communist China, it also had to end policies that left that nation "in angry isolation." He concluded that in the "long run, it means pulling China back into the world community—but as a great and progressing nation, not as the epicenter of world revolution." Nixon's change elicited little comment, as did his statement at the 1968 GOP Convention that he wished to extend "the hand of friendship to all peoples, to the Russians, to the Chinese, to all the people in the world." Apparently Mao at least had read the *Foreign Affairs* article, but other Chinese Communists were quoted as saying that Nixon and Johnson were "jackals of the same lair."⁶

After he was elected president, Nixon appointed as national security advisor a German-born Harvard professor, Henry Kissinger, who shared his interests in geopolitics. The two believed that the world was divided into five great power centers—the United States, the USSR, China, Western Europe, and Japan. This multipolar world was supposed to lend itself to a sort of balance of power similar to what occurred in nineteenth-century Europe. Nixon's view was that he would play the "China card," as it was called, to check Soviet power and also to get some assistance in ending the Vietnam War. So in 1969 and in the early 1970s, Richard Nixon confidentially let it be known that he was interested in exploring some form of reconciliation with the People's Republic of China. The Johnson administration in its last two years in office came to recognize that China did not pose a threat to enter the war in Indochina as it originally feared. Nixon accepted that judgment, although he turned down Johnson's offer that his administration would reopen talks with the PRC to make it easier for his successor.⁷

In the mid-1960s, the Soviets had denounced the Chinese for the actions of some of their border guards and for several conflicts that broke out along their 4,500-mile long mutual border. In the past, there had been confrontations over Chenpao Island, Heilonkian (Heilongjian) Province, and Sinkaing (Xinjiang) Province. As one historian has noted, Nixon regarded the Sino-Soviet split as the most significant geopolitical event since World War II, and he adroitly moved to exploit it. Kissinger very clearly admitted that Sino-American flirtations were meant to provide a way to halt Soviet expansion.⁸

The president moved cautiously at first, and on July 21, 1969, the State Department announced a modest easing of trade and travel restriction. Scholars, professors, journalists, and students were encouraged to apply to visit China. An

note numbers
outside
quotation marks

7 1/2 inches

4 1/2 inches